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Postmaterialism and Political Elites:
The Value Priorities of Brazilian Federal 
Legislators
Malu A. C. Gatto and Timothy J. Power
Abstract: We examine the distribution and consequences of postmaterialist 
value orientations among national legislators in Brazil. Using data collected 
in the Brazilian Legislative Survey in 2013, we undertake the first systematic 
study of postmaterialism within the National Congress and the party system 
and map the materialist/postmaterialist scale onto other salient divisions 
within the political class. We present five main findings. First, political elites 
evince vastly higher commitment to postmaterialism than the mass public. 
Second, Brazilian political elites drawn from constituencies with higher 
human development are more postmaterialist than their counterparts in 
other constituencies. Third, within the political class, the materialist/post-
materialist cleavage overlaps in important ways with the left–right cleavage. 
Fourth, although postmaterialism successfully predicts elite attitudes on a 
number of “new politics” issues that are unrelated to the construction of the 
postmaterialist scale itself, postmaterialism is a poor predictor of voting 
behavior on the Congressional floor. Fifth, as others before us, we find 
institutional factors to be better predictors of legislative voting behavior in 
the Brazilian context.  
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Introduction  
In the 2014 Brazilian national elections, parties and candidates were 
confronted with a growing demand to debate “new politics” issues.1 This 
happened at both the legislative and executive levels, with political par-
ties being pressured to explain their parliamentarians’ homophobic and 
sexist discourses, and presidential candidates being asked to present their 
views on abortion, legalization of marijuana, and gay rights (see Segalia 
2014; Benites and Rossi 2014). As “culture wars” gained prime time 
attention in political media coverage and official campaigns, it became 
clear that electoral politics was no longer restricted to the traditional 
issues of the economy, health care, and public security. In debating new 
agendas, Brazil was consistent with some regional trends: Chile has taken 
up a long-postponed debate on abortion rights, Mexico has examined 
the possibility of legalizing marijuana, and Colombian courts have begun 
to recognize same-sex marriages performed abroad. Despite these devel-
opments, little is known about elite preferences on “new politics” issues, 
especially in emerging democracies such as Brazil.  
The void of analyses on this topic stems from theoretical disjunc-
ture and a lack of data. The theoretical disjuncture is a consequence of 
the fact that most theories of political culture have been developed to 
understand the collective priorities of the mass public, not of elites. The 
lack of data is a result of insufficient efforts to survey elites on emerging 
new politics issues – even while data on the value priorities of the mass 
public have systematically accompanied theoretical developments and 
have been gathered routinely since the early 1980s. Nonetheless, under-
standing the attitudes of political elites is relevant not only because there 
seems to have been a surge in the demand for politicians to express these 
attitudes, but especially because elites control policymaking. Given that 
politicians run on specific platforms and ideologies, it is also more likely 
that they have more defined and stable preferences than the average 
citizen (Converse 1964).  
In this paper,2 we assess the causes and consequences of postmate-
rialist value priorities among the Brazilian political class. Using elite-level 
data collected in the seventh wave of the Brazilian Legislative Survey in 
1  The term “new politics” is generally associated with contemporary social issues, 
such as same-sex marriage, reproductive rights, gender identity assurances, and 
environmental protection.  
2  The authors are grateful to Andréa Freitas for sharing roll-call data, and to Amy 
Erica Smith, Cesar Zucco, and the anonymous JPLA reviewers for comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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2013, we start by comparing the value priorities of political elites (N=148 
in 2013) to those of the Brazilian mass public as measured in the most 
recent World Values Survey conducted in that country (N=1486 in 
2014).3 We then provide the first systematic analysis of the distribution 
of postmaterialism within the National Congress and the party system, 
and map the materialist/postmaterialist scale onto other salient divisions 
within the political class, such as left–right ideology and territorial cleav-
ages associated with socioeconomic modernization. We also explore the 
determinants of postmaterialism among the political class, before revers-
ing the lens to test the explanatory power of postmaterialism in predict-
ing the positioning and voting behavior of MPs on salient “new politics” 
issues. 
We offer five key findings. First, Brazilian political elites evince 
vastly higher commitment to postmaterialist values than members of the 
mass public. Second, legislators drawn from constituencies with high 
human development are more postmaterialist than their counterparts 
from less-developed regions. Third, for the political class, the material-
ist/postmaterialist cleavage overlaps with the left–right cleavage, espe-
cially when data are aggregated to the level of political parties. Fourth, in 
accordance with value change theory, postmaterialism successfully pre-
dicts individual elite orientations on a number of “new politics” issues 
that are unrelated to the construction of the postmaterialist scale itself. 
Fifth, in keeping with a long tradition of literature on the Brazilian Con-
gress, we find institutional factors to be better predictors of legislative 
voting behavior than ideology or values.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into eight sections. The first 
revisits the core concepts and predictions of value change theory. The 
second section yields our main hypotheses concerning Brazil and intro-
duces our data sources. The third section explores the degree of congru-
ence between levels of postmaterialism in the mass public and among 
federal legislators. We then focus exclusively on politicians. In the fourth 
section, we map postmaterialism among Brazilian legislators. In the fifth 
section, we investigate the determinants of postmaterialism for the Bra-
zilian political class. In the sixth section, we reverse the analytical lens 
and apply postmaterialism as an independent variable, asking whether it 
contributes to our understanding to elite attitudes on several emerging 
3  The Brazilian Legislative Surveys, conducted among members of both houses 
of Congress, began in 1990 and are available at <https://dataverse.harvard. 
edu/dataverse/bls>. The World Values Surveys, conducted among mass pub-
lics of over 80 societies, began in 1981 and are available at <www.worldvalues 
survey.org>. 
 36 Malu A. C. Gatto and Timothy J. Power 
issues on the public agenda. In the seventh section, we analyze whether 
postmaterialism predicts legislative voting behavior related to environ-
mental protection. The eighth and final section presents conclusions and 
goals for future research.
Revisiting Value Change Theory 
The thesis of postmaterialism, first posed by Ronald Inglehart in the 
1970s, launched a prominent research program in comparative political 
culture and later inspired the World Values Surveys (WVS). Postmaterial-
ism is a theory of collective value change based on a Maslowian hierar-
chy of needs. According to this theory, rising levels of economic pros-
perity and physical security – in conjunction with the natural demograph-
ic process of intergenerational population replacement – generate a “cul-
ture shift” in which a given society’s value priorities gradually change 
from “materialist” to “postmaterialist.” This shift impacts political life in 
myriad ways (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Postmaterialist theory begins with the observation that, in tradition-
al societies, individuals are generally preoccupied with fundamental needs 
such as economic and physical safety, housing, and food. However, as 
sustained economic development leads to more prosperous societies in 
which basic needs are more easily met, individuals begin to accord priori-
ty to newer, nonmaterial values (Inglehart 1971: 991). These values in-
clude personal emancipation, aesthetic satisfaction, and a wide range of 
issues connected to the quality of life. Postmaterialists give high im-
portance to equal rights, personal freedoms, environmental sustainability, 
and female empowerment. Postmaterialists are responsible for many of 
the “green” and “new politics” movements that have transcended the 
traditional left–right cleavage in recent decades. Suspicious of bureau-
cratic authority and technocratic governance, postmaterialists tend to 
prefer grassroots, participatory forms of democracy. Libertarian in their 
instincts, they are tolerant of divorce, abortion, homosexuality, and im-
migration (Janmaat and Braun 2009). Although far better educated than 
their parents and grandparents, postmaterialists are often economic un-
derachievers relative to their high levels of schooling, preferring to do 
work they find interesting rather than sell their labor for the highest 
remuneration. However, this in no way compromises their impact on 
society at large: postmaterialists often make their presence felt in educa-
tional institutions, the arts, and the media, meaning that their cultural 
influence is disproportionately high when compared to their raw num-
bers (De Graaf and Evans 1996: 609).  
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As population replacement causes the ratio between postmaterialists 
and materialists to shift in favor of the former, politics changes in palpa-
ble ways. Political divisions associated with the “modernization” phase 
of socioeconomic development begin to give way to the travails of 
“postmodernization.” Traditional left–right conflicts over state manage-
ment of the economy do not disappear, but are instead joined by new 
cleavages focusing on quality-of-life issues, equal rights, and personal 
behavior, some of which give rise to “green politics” and “culture wars” 
(Inglehart and Abramson 1999). In more permissive electoral systems, 
these emerging issues may generate challenger parties along a “new poli-
tics” axis, pitting postmaterialists against forces of tradition. In more 
restrictive electoral systems, the traditional parties must somehow ac-
commodate or adapt to postmodern agendas.  
As they arrive on the political scene, postmaterialists work both in-
side and outside of traditional institutions to advance new goals of social 
tolerance and environmental sustainability. Rejecting the goal of “devel-
opment at any cost,” postmaterialists are willing to trade away some 
economic growth in order to obtain a higher quality of life. The im-
portance of value change becomes evident as postmaterialists begin to 
win significant space in the party system and legislature. Championed by 
postmaterialists and aided by population replacement, ideas that were 
once associated with a countercultural minority – such as environmental 
protection and same-sex marriage – become public policies that are bind-
ing upon everyone. 
Given that postmaterialism is positively associated with socioeco-
nomic modernization, it is not surprising that the World Values Surveys 
(which was initiated in 1981 and incorporated more than 80 societies in 
the first six waves) show immense variation in cross-national patterns of 
value priorities. While the vast majority of citizens in most societies can-
not be classified as either postmaterialists or materialists (most exhibit 
“mixed” value priorities), one key macropolitical insight can be obtained 
by simply examining the relative sizes of these two groups. This is usually 
done by simply reporting the percentage of postmaterialists minus the 
percentage of materialists (see Appendix A for an explanation of these 
classifications). Figure 1 shows this figure for selected developed coun-
tries and for all Latin American societies included in the sixth wave 
(2010–2014) of the WVS. In Sweden, postmaterialists now vastly out-
number materialists, while the opposite is true for five of the eight Latin 
American societies (the regional outliers are Colombia, Uruguay, and 
Mexico). 
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Figure 1. Percentage Postmaterialists minus Percentage Materialists, 
Selected Developed and Latin American Countries, WVS Wave 
6, 2010–2014 
Source:  WVS Wave 6 (2010–2014). 
Note:  Sample sizes range from 1000–2232 per country.  
Among the Latin American cases in the sixth wave of the WVS, Brazil 
ranks the lowest on the PM-M indicator, with roughly 32 percent of the 
public exhibiting materialist value priorities and only 12 percent being 
classified as postmaterialists in 2014. 
While the early literature on postmaterialism focused heavily on 
prosperous Western European societies, the fact that a given society 
possesses low observed values of postmaterialism at a given point in 
time (for example, Brazil in 2014) is irrelevant to empirical testing of the 
theory. Postmaterialism is a theory of change in which the baseline condi-
tion is a society dominated by a materialist value syndrome. Cautiously 
recovering a central tenet of modernization theory, recent theoretical 
work by Inglehart and his collaborators has claimed that human societies 
change in more or less predictable ways. The original insights of post-
materialism are being subsumed into broader and more ambitious 
frameworks, such as “postmodernization” (a multidimensional concept 
of which value change is only one aspect, see Inglehart 1997) or the 
“human development sequence” (a revised and universal theory of mod-
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ernization that links economic development to a rising emphasis on self-
expression values, which in turn are conducive to political democratiza-
tion; see Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2014). Although these vari-
ants of value change theory differ in subtle ways, they make virtually 
identical predictions about less developed societies. Specifically, while 
these societies may possess comparatively low levels of economic and 
physical security, postmaterialists will appear first among social strata 
that have access to these goods. 
Therefore, although Latin America might observe a value syndrome 
that is heavily materialist at the aggregate level, we can still test for with-
in-society variation, and we should expect postmaterialists to emerge 
from among the more socioeconomically privileged. Postmaterialism 
should vary positively with income and with education (especially tertiary 
education; see De Graaf and Evans 1996). As such, even though post-
materialism may not be diffused among the general population, we 
should expect it to be predominant within a more homogenous set of 
the population, such as the political elite – a group that displays compar-
atively high levels of educational attainment and income. 
Hypotheses and Data 
The theory outlined in the previous section allows us to derive some 
basic hypotheses. These hypotheses have been built largely on cross-
national work, but can easily be adapted to a single-country case study 
that explores intra-elite cleavages. 
Political elites are relatively homogenous groups that are distinct 
from the mass public in significant ways. They are generally more edu-
cated and affluent than their constituents. Given their job responsibili-
ties, politicians are also more directly exposed to and knowledgeable 
about political, economic, and social issues. As such, political elites are 
expected to display higher levels of postmaterialist tendencies, even in 
societies that are otherwise overwhelmingly materialist (Cámara Fuertes 
2009).  
Following value change theory, we contend that socioeconomic 
modernization fosters postmaterialism. Brazil has spectacular regional 
differences in terms of economic development. In a now-classic fable 
dating from the days of military dictatorship, the distinguished Brazilian 
economist Edmar Bacha (1976) renamed his country as “Belindia,” to 
signify a society in which a small upper-middle class with Belgian levels 
of prosperity was surrounded by a poor majority with Indian levels of 
deprivation. The Belindian hypothesis is directly relevant to our study: 
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value change theory predicts that postmaterialism should appear first in 
“Belgium” before it arrives in “India.” Therefore, politicians representing 
more “modern” constituencies should be more postmaterialist than 
those representing poorer electoral bases. 
Within the world of Brazilian political elites, we assume that both 
postmaterialists and left-wing parties should coincide in their opposition 
to “traditional politics” in Brazil – an exclusionary model that has com-
bined oligarchy, authoritarianism, income concentration, and frequent 
physical repression. Thus, we should expect a correlation between value 
priorities and political ideology in Brazil: postmaterialists should be 
found disproportionately in leftist parties (for international comparisons, 
see Savage 1985; Kitschelt 1994). 
The literature on postmaterialism suggests that Brazilian legislators 
with postmaterialist value priorities should adopt progressive positions 
on several controversial issues before Congress, such as reproductive 
rights, marriage equality, and climate change. At the same time, a large 
body of literature on executive–legislative relations in Brazil suggests that 
legislators may not be free to vote the way they think. Given party cen-
tralization, coalitional politics, and the presence of a legislative whip, 
politicians are constrained by discipline on the floor of Congress (see, 
among others, Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, 2000; Amorim Neto 2002; 
Power 2010). For empirical testing, we will adopt the intuitive directional 
hypothesis that attitudinal postmaterialism predicts legislative behavior. 
These ideas can be expressed more formally as follows: 
 
H1. Federal legislators should be more postmaterialist than members of 
the mass public.  
 
H2. Postmaterialism should vary positively with leftist political ideology 
(H2a) and with the level of socioeconomic modernization of electoral 
constituencies (H2b).  
 
H3. Postmaterialist federal legislators should hold distinctive positions 
on “new politics” issues. Postmaterialism should predict greater attitu-
dinal acceptance of (H3a) abortion rights, (H3b) gay rights, and (H3c) 
environmental protection. 
 
H4. Attitudes should predict legislative behavior: members of Congress 
who score high on the PM index should be more likely to vote for iden-
tifiably postmaterialist positions on “new politics” issues, when control-
ling for institutional factors and party politics issues. 
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To test these hypotheses, we draw upon two datasets. The first is the 
Brazil 2014 module of the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS was 
administered to a national probability sample of 1486 Brazilians in 2014 
by researchers at the University of Brasília. The second data source is the 
seventh wave of the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS), an extensive 
questionnaire that was completed by 148 members of the Brazilian Con-
gress between March and July 2013 (a response rate of 25 percent). Un-
like previous waves of the BLS, the 2013 edition replicated a number of 
survey items from the global WVS questionnaire, including the four-item 
and 12-item postmaterialism batteries developed by Inglehart. To our 
knowledge, this is the first time that these indicators have been directly 
replicated within a sample of national legislators in Latin America.4 We 
examine the BLS dataset separately, but we also artificially pool the re-
spondents of both surveys for a preliminary inspection of the effect of 
political elite status on value priorities.  
Elites and Masses: Testing for Congruence of 
Value Priorities
We started by assessing the level of elite-mass congruence with regard to 
value priorities. The low overall proportion of postmaterialists in the 
Brazilian mass public does not automatically imply that value change 
theory cannot be applied to Brazil. H1 anticipates that federal legislators 
will be more postmaterialist than the Brazilian mass public, following 
decades of comparative research showing that postmaterialism varies 
positively with both education and income. Relative to their constituents, 
members of the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies consistently 
exhibit extreme values on these two variables. While precise estimates are 
impossible, our reasoned guess is that, in terms of education, the median 
legislator is probably somewhere around the 97th percentile in the na-
tional distribution, and that all legislators would be in the top 1 percent 
4  The PM battery was applied to a sample of 79 Puerto Rican assembly members 
in 2001 (Cámara Fuertes 2009). Treminio and Melián (2010) developed an al-
ternative measure of “legislative postmaterialism” using a large number of sub-
stantive questions from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) da-
taset. Therefore, their results (which capture values, not value priorities) are not 
equivalent to the measures used by Inglehart or the WVS. Measures that cap-
ture “value priorities” are those that induce respondents to identify the ordering 
of their preferences on a set of issues, forcing them to rank materialist and 
postmaterialist goals directly against one another. 
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of income earners based on their congressional salaries alone.5 This is 
hardly unique to Brazil, as elected legislators rarely look like their con-
stituents, and descriptive representation with regard to levels of educa-
tion, personal wealth, and gender is traditionally low, especially in devel-
oping societies (Hughes 2013). 
Figure 2. Comparing the Value Priorities of Brazilian Citizens (WVS 2014) 
and Federal Legislators (BLS 2013), Using the Four-Item Post-
materialism Battery  
Source:  WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014), BLS Wave 7 (2013). 
Figure 2 provides strong visual support for H1. Among members of the 
Brazilian mass public in WVS 2014, there were almost three times more 
materialists than postmaterialists in Brazil. Among members of Congress 
in BLS 2013, the ratio of postmaterialists to materialists was approxi-
mately 7:5.  
A more precise test of H1 can be obtained by pooling the responses 
of elites and masses into a single model and also using the superior 12-
5  The salary of legislators in 2013 was BRL 26,723 per month, which is more 
than 39 multiples of the minimum wage. This wage is paid to them 14 times 
per year, for an annual salary of approximately USD 166,000 (using the average 
exchange rate for 2013). The vast majority of legislators also have other signifi-
cant sources of income. 
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item postmaterialism battery, which generates a continuous variable 
ranging from zero to five (Appendix A). Ideally, we would do this on 
survey data collected within both populations at the same point in time, 
but this is impossible. It would be equally unfeasible to field a national 
probability sample in which members of Congress were assigned their 
actual weight in the population (0.00003 percent). Therefore, and be-
cause of the fact that this is an exploratory analysis, we did the next best 
thing: we simply inserted the BLS 2013 respondents into the WVS 2014 
dataset, assigned a dummy variable where the value of one identifies 
professional politicians,6 and estimated a pooled model in which the 
dependent variable is the PM12 score. Members of Congress then made 
up just over 9 percent of this unconventionally pooled “sample.” This 
artificial merging of independent samples is wholly suboptimal and does 
not yield “real” statistical inferences, but it does provide an interesting 
first look at congruence on value priorities in Brazil in 2013–2014 by 
exploiting two very recent datasets. As a thought experiment, one could 
liken this exercise to a public forum in Brazil in which a national proba-
bility sample of 1500 ordinary Brazilians was invited to sit in an auditori-
um together with 150 randomly drawn members of Congress. If every-
one in the room were asked to privately to disclose their value priorities 
(and bearing in mind that political elites are vastly overrepresented in the 
room), how would the politicians differ from the mass public? 
The model in Table 1 includes a binary variable for politicians. We 
then interacted the politician dummy with as many of the other inde-
pendent variables as possible. Since all BLS respondents are coded here 
as belonging to the highest decile of income using WVS criteria, the 
interaction term (income*politician) was perfectly collinear with the 
coefficient for politician. The interaction term between politician and 
HDI State was also dropped, as variance inflation factor (VIF) tests 
showed that the inclusion of the variable led to severe multicollinearity 
that rendered estimations unstable.7 Consequently, we had to exclude 
these two interaction terms from the model, but we retained interactions 
6  Given that Brazil has approximately 65,000 elected subnational officeholders 
and thousands more appointed officials, it is possible that the WVS Brazil sam-
ple (N=1486) could have randomly included one or more “political elites” who 
are not coded as such here. The probability of this occurring is close to zero. 
7  The inclusion of the variable almost tripled the total VIF for the model to 
61.11 and, on its own, had a value of 238.97.  
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with our other control variables, which are (left–right) ideology, age, 
educational attainment,8 and (female) gender. 
Table 1. The Impact of Political Elite Status on Postmaterialism, Artificial 
Pooling of WVS 2014 and BLS 2013  
 DV: 12-Item Postmaterialism Score, OLS 
 Model 1 
Politician (Congress) 1.969** 
 (0.816) 
HDI State 0.463 
 (0.649) 
Ideology -0.008 
 (0.012) 
Ideology*Politician -0.301*** 
 (0.044) 
Income 0.014 
 (0.018) 
Age -0.005** 
 (0.002) 
Age*Politician 0.015** 
 (0.007) 
Education 0.054*** 
 (0.014) 
Education*Politician -0.164** 
 (0.080) 
Female 0.028 
 (0.070) 
Female*Politician 0.731** 
 (0.317) 
HDI State 1.657*** 
 (0.490) 
Constant  
 0.072 
N 1147 
R-squared 0.072 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. WVS surveys code income into intranational deciles. Since all 
BLS respondents were coded as belonging to the highest decile of income, the 
interaction term for income and politician was perfectly collinear with the coef-
ficient for politician. We have therefore excluded this term from the model.  
To make the ideology scores for politicians comparable to those includ-
ed in the WVS, we are forced to use the self-reported ideology scores 
8  Differently from subsequent analyses restricted to politicians, in which we used 
an expanded 11-point scale of education, in the pooled model we used the orig-
inal WVS nine-point scale so that all observations were coded in the same way. 
 Postmaterialism and Political Elites 45 
from the BLS (and not the rescaled measure used in our subsequent 
analyses). This decision means that in the artificially pooled model in 
Table 1, all respondents (both elites and masses) have located themselves 
on an identical 1–10 scale, where one equals left and 10 equals right. 
Although there are many problems with using left–right self-placements 
for Brazilian politicians (Power and Zucco 2009, 2012), this is the only 
way to arrive at a single consistent metric. 
The main finding of our artificial congruence model is that “elite” 
status – that is, membership of Congress – is a strong predictor of post-
materialist values, as can be seen in the large magnitude of the “politi-
cian” coefficient. This effect is net of income and HDI (our measures of 
economic security in the model), which now cannot be interacted with 
the binary variable for professional legislator.  
The most interesting finding of Table 1 relates to ideology. While 
the coefficient for ideology is negative, as expected (suggesting that 
postmaterialist values are associated with the political left), it is not statis-
tically significant. However, the interaction term between ideology and 
politician is highly significant. This is likely an artifact of two familiar 
phenomena in survey research. First, ordinary Brazilian citizens have 
been shown to have difficulty in defining the terms of “left” and “right” 
and in locating themselves consistently on an ideological scale (González 
and Queirolo 2013; Zucco 2015). Second, even in societies that have 
much higher levels of literacy or educational attainment than Brazil, and 
presumably have fewer informational asymmetries between elites and 
masses, we should still expect elites to display higher levels of ideological 
constraint (Converse 1964).  
The ideology measure used in Table 1 should be interpreted in the 
light of well-known biases in the left–right self-placements of Brazilian 
politicians. Conservative Brazilian politicians routinely place themselves 
to the left of where everyone else would place them; this phenomenon 
has been nicknamed the direita envergonhada (Power 2000; Power and 
Zucco 2009, 2012). Note that this bias is now embedded in Model 1 and 
should actually work against our hypotheses. If postmaterialism is linked 
to leftist ideology, and a large minority of Brazilian politicians then mis-
represent their ideology by placing themselves further to the left than 
they really are (a bias almost certainly reflected in Model 1), this could 
potentially obscure the “real” relationship between ideology and post-
materialism at the elite level, which is captured in Model 1 by an interac-
tion term.  
Age has no clear effect in the pooled model: as expected, it produc-
es a negative and statistically significant coefficient; however, when it is 
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interacted with politician, it becomes positive, which means that older 
politicians are more likely to hold postmaterialist values than their 
younger counterparts. The independent effect of education on postmate-
rialism is positive, as expected, but when interacted with Congressional 
membership the coefficient becomes negative. In other words, the artifi-
cial congruence model suggests that Brazilian legislators are actually less 
postmaterialist than their extremely high educational levels would lead us 
to expect. The interaction between female gender and politician is also 
statistically significant (we return to this issue later). Overall, the predict-
ed relationship between elite status and postmaterialism is still clearly 
visible in Model 1, which suggests strong support for H1. 
In this section, we have explored whether elite status is an im-
portant predictor of postmaterialist values. In other words, by pooling 
elite and mass public data we sought to investigate whether Brazilian 
federal legislators were significantly different from the mass public in 
regards to the PM-M scale. Although the sample is artificially composed 
and the findings are entirely irreproducible (no survey of the mass public 
would ever be large enough to draw valid inferences about federal legis-
lators), the findings are still interesting and suggestive. Returning to our 
thought experiment of an auditorium containing both politicians and 
ordinary voters, we would probably find – even after controlling for the 
fact that professional politicians are vastly richer and more educated than 
the average Brazilian – that members of Congress are notably more 
postmaterialist than members of the mass public. In the next section, we 
present descriptive statistics to further probe the distribution of post-
materialist values across Brazilian legislators. We then return to more 
conventional statistical analyses, using a representative sample of elites, 
to test our remaining hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4). 
A Profile of Legislative Postmaterialism in Brazil 
Of the 148 respondents in BLS7, 138 could be classified using the origi-
nal four-item battery of postmaterialism, which was first used in the 
Eurobarometer survey in 1970 (see Appendix A). Of these 138 politi-
cians, 63 percent exhibited mixed value priorities, while 21.7 percent 
were classified as postmaterialists and 15.2 percent as materialists. Thus, 
within Congress, the percentage of postmaterialists minus materialists is 
a positive number (5.5). By this simple measure, the profile of the Brazil-
ian political class resembles that of the German or Mexican mass public 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 3. Postmaterialism and Left–right Ideology among Principal Political 
Parties in Congress, 2013
Source:  BLS 2013. 
Note:  The figure shows only those parties with more than five valid responses on the 
PM variable. Parties are placed (by non-members) on a scale where 1 is left 
and 10 is right. N=10 parties, R=-.760, sig=.011. 
BLS7 also asked respondents to complete the more comprehensive 12-
item battery of postmaterialism, with a valid N of 137 on this variable. 
The 12-item battery generates a continuous variable that can range from 
zero (no postmaterialist values were accorded high priority) to five (all 
five postmaterialist values were accorded high priority). Taken as a 
whole, the Brazilian Congress sits exactly on the midpoint of the scale at 
2.47, but this masks significant differences among the parties. The two 
most important ideological parties of the left, the PT and its satellite the 
PC do B, have the highest PM12 scores, while the lowest scores are held 
by the Democrats (DEM, ex-PFL) and the Republican Party (PR). While 
the PR is a small political arm of Pentecostal pastors and churches, the 
fading DEM is a more traditional party of the ideological right (in the 
“liberal” sense as its original name implied). Of our seven respondents 
from the PR, three are members of the “Evangelical Caucus” (Frente 
Parlamentar Evangélica, a cross-party group of Protestants, most of whom 
are Pentecostal) and hold sharply traditionalist positions on social issues, 
while none of our 11 DEM politicians identifies as a member of this 
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caucus. Therefore, the reasons driving the low scores on these two right-
of-center parties may well be different. What is most striking, however, is 
that the left and right “extremist” parties also exhibit the lowest standard 
deviations on the PM12 variable. Unsurprisingly, ideological extremism 
is associated with clearer value priorities. 
A visual inspection of Figure 3 gives strong support to H2a, which 
posits that postmaterialism should be negatively correlated with rightist 
ideology in Brazil. At the individual level, the correlation between a re-
scaled measure of ideology drawn from BLS data (on which higher val-
ues represent more rightist positions; see Zucco 2014) and the PM12 
variable is -0.472 (N=134, p <0.01). At the party level, the relationship is 
much stronger, with a coefficient of -0.760 for the 10 parties displayed in 
Figure 3. The core left-of-center parties of Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva and Dilma Rousseff over the past 13 years (PT, PC do B, and 
PSB)9 are located in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 3. 
Table 2. Mean Postmaterialism Scores of Legislators by Human Develop-
ment of State Electoral Constituency (Brazilian States by Terciles 
of HDI as of 2010) 
HDI Tercile HDI 2010 
Range 
States in Category Mean PM12 
of Legisla-
tors 
N Re-
sponses 
High Human 
Development .824–.731 
DF, SP, SC, RJ, PR, 
RS, ES, GO, MG 2.750 68 
Med. Human 
Development .729–.674 
MS, MT, AP, RR, 
TO, RO, RN, CE, 
AM 
2.276 29 
Low Human 
Development .673–.631 
PE, SE, AC, BA, 
PB, PI, PA, MA, AL 2.150 40 
Totals .824–.631 all 27 states 2.474 137 
Source: For state HDI: United Nations Development Programme (PNUD), Atlas de 
Desenvolvimento Humano do Brasil, 2013. 
Note:  States are listed from top to bottom in their rank order of HDI in 2010. For state 
abbreviations, see Appendix A. For calculation of the PM12 variable, see Ap-
pendix B.  
Overall, we found preliminary support for H2a, which is that postmate-
rialists and leftists – who should share an opposition to “traditional poli-
tics” and unfettered market capitalism, respectively – should jointly reject 
the Brazilian right, and therefore cluster together within the same politi-
cal parties. 
9  The Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) left the PT-led coalition in 2013 and op-
posed Dilma’s reelection in 2014. 
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Descriptive analysis also gives some support to H2b, which propos-
es that politicians representing constituencies of relatively higher human 
development should be more postmaterialist than their colleagues from 
poorer regions. Historically, Brazil has had spectacularly uneven devel-
opments across its five major regions, with the South and Center-South 
being the most economically advanced. Following Bacha’s metaphor of 
Brazil as “Belindia,” we suspect that the “Belgium” should be more 
postmaterialist than the “India,” and that legislative representation 
should imperfectly capture this cleavage. Dividing Brazil’s 27 states into 
terciles of the Human Development Index, we find that legislators repre-
senting the nine most developed states are far more postmaterialist than 
their peers from the least developed tercile, in which eight of the nine 
states are located in the Northeast. However, we acknowledge that the 
Belindia metaphor is not exclusively a territorial cleavage. It also high-
lights the marble-cake pattern of Brazilian modernization, implying that 
“Belgium” already exists within the capital cities and cosmopolitan mid-
dle classes of even the poorest states – just as, overall, Mumbai is pre-
sumably more postmaterialist than rural India. 
Determinants of Postmaterialism among  
Federal Legislators 
Bivariate analyses suggest that postmaterialism among Brazilian federal 
legislators is associated with membership in leftist parties with electoral 
connections to more economically developed constituencies. In Table 3, 
we estimate three multivariate models predicting postmaterialism among 
legislators using the 12-item battery.  
Here, we have included three alternative measures of district-level 
human development. In Model 1 we use the HDI of respondents’ feder-
al units, as all our respondents are elected “statewide” in their districts 
(HDI State). In Model 2 we substituted a dummy variable for “modern” 
Brazil (this is scored as 1 if the legislator represents the South, Center-
South, or the Federal District, and zero otherwise). Finally, in Model 3 
we used an individual-level measure that was calculated by multiplying 
municipalities’ HDI values by the weight that each municipality contrib-
utes to the personal vote total of each elected legislator (HDI Personal 
Vote). This reflects the fact that legislative representation in Brazil takes 
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diverse forms, including the targeting of non-contiguous constituencies 
within states (Cheibub 2009).10 
To test H2a (postmaterialism and ideology), we included a more 
precise individual-level measure of left–right placement, using Zucco’s 
Bayesian rescaling of the entire BLS time series to anchor the individual 
estimates for 2013 (Zucco 2014). The ideology variable was centered at 
zero, with -1 representing the leftmost position and +1 the rightmost. 
We included several control variables. Postmaterialism should vary 
negatively with age and positively with education, economic security, and 
gender. Recall, however, that this is a sample of politicians, and these 
three factors vary far less among the political class than they do among 
the Brazilian mass public. Age is distributed closely around the mean of 
57 for members of Congress, with only 10 percent of BLS respondents 
aged under 40. Our 11-point measure of education extends the nine-
point scale used in the WVS with a view to capturing the far higher edu-
cational attainment of professional politicians. Most of the variation in 
the sample is at the tertiary level; some 47 percent of BLS 2013 respond-
ents had completed an undergraduate degree and another 29 percent had 
completed some type of postgraduate degree – this means that a total of 
76 percent of respondents have at least an undergraduate education.11 To 
calculate personal wealth, we used official data from candidate affidavits 
filed with the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). We then logged individual 
wealth, creating a variable that ranges from 2.950 to 19.783 and has a 
mean of 12.950.12 We also included a binary variable for female gender. 
10  Each of the 26 Brazilian states is subdivided into a number of municipalities, 
ranging from 15 (Roraima) to 853 (Minas Gerais), with a mean of 214 and a 
median of 155 units. Congressional candidates run statewide and may receive 
votes in any municipality. We have HDI scores and candidate vote shares for 
all 5570 municipalities, which enables us to use ecological analysis to inspect 
how differing levels of human development contributed to each legislator’s 
vote profile. Thus, the variable “HDI Personal Vote” represents the human 
development level of each legislator’s effective electoral base, as if all the legisla-
tor’s supporters were concentrated in a single imaginary municipality. (The 27th 
“state,” the Federal District, is not subdivided into municipalities, so the value 
of HDIPV is the same for the two BLS respondents from Brasília.) 
11  The BLS 2013 codebook is available at <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/149 
70>. 
12  These data are available from www.tse.gov.br and are republished on numerous 
journalistic and NGO websites (for example, <http://noticias.uol.com.br/poli 
tica/politicos-brasil/>). The personal fortunes of the 148 BLS respondents at 
the moment at which they registered their candidacies (expressed in USD of 
2012) ranged from USD 19.11 to nearly USD 400 million, which is why we log 
this variable. 
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Some 12.8 percent of the sample is female, which is roughly the same 
proportion found within the Brazilian National Congress.13 Some re-
search on value change within European mass publics has found men to 
be slightly more postmaterialist than women, with a larger gender gap in 
predominantly Catholic societies. However, these findings have been 
contested recently (e.g., Hayes, McAllister and Studlar 2000) and in any 
case may be conditional on socioeconomic development (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003).14 We are not aware of any direct test of the gender rela-
tionship on a sample of national politicians.15  
Table 3 shows consistent support for H2a (ideology) and H2b (hu-
man development of constituencies). The three alternative measures of 
socioeconomic modernization have similar positive effects (if corrected 
for their respective scales), suggesting that postmaterialist politicians fare 
better electorally in the more developed regions of Brazil. The more 
precise individual-level measure of ideology is consistent with what we 
see in Figure 3; that is, postmaterialists in Congress tend to be left of 
center. Among the control variables, personal wealth, age and gender are 
statistically significant, but the signs produced by the coefficients of two 
of these variables (personal wealth and age) are the opposite of what was 
predicted by postmaterialist theory. This is likely due to sample homoge-
neity and severely truncated variance on these three predictors. 
Again, we found that female gender is a positive and significant 
predictor of postmaterialism among Brazilian politicians in Congress. We 
see two possible explanations for this. 
13  In the 2011–2014 Brazilian legislature, women occupied 8.58 percent of seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies and 14.81 percent of seats in the Senate.  
14  The relationships among gender, postmaterialism, and ideology at different 
levels of socioeconomic modernization are complex, as postulated in Inglehart 
and Norris’ (2003) “developmental theory of the gender gap.” In developing 
countries, a “traditional gender gap” finds women politically to the right of 
men, while in postindustrial societies the “modern gender gap” shows exactly 
the opposite pattern. Inglehart and Norris (2003: 94–97) claimed that the shift 
to the modern gender gap is predominantly a result of cultural change; that is, 
the growth of postmaterialism leads to more egalitarian positions regarding 
gender roles. 
15  Vanderleeuw, Sandovici, and Jarman (2011) conducted a survey of 155 munici-
pal politicians in Texas and found that females were more postmaterialist than 
males. Their survey asked politicians to rank 13 factors influencing community 
development priorities, and is therefore not directly comparable to WVS batter-
ies. 
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Table 3. Assessing the Determinants of Postmaterialism among Federal 
Legislators, 2013 
 DV: 12-Item Postmaterialism Score, OLS 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
HDI State 6.154***   
 (1.761)   
“Modern” Brazil  0.518**  
  (0.163)  
HDI Personal Vote   5.783*** 
   (1.528) 
Ideology (Zucco re-
scaled) -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.457*** 
 (0.093) (0.098) (0.093) 
Personal Wealth (log) -0.135** -0.110** -0.125** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
Age 0.016** 0.014* 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Education -0.030 -0.028 -0.026 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
Female 0.617** 0.599** 0.531* 
 (0.263) (0.268) (0.273) 
Constant -1.060 2.900*** -0.938 
 (1.264) (0.770) (1.213) 
N 134 134 129 
R-squared 0.357 0.346 0.357 
Note:  Robust P-values in parentheses. Goodness of fit in the logit model is Nagel-
kerke R2. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. “Modern” Brazil is 
a dummy variable scored as 1 if the legislator hails from the South (Rio 
Grande do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina), the Center-South (São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo), or the Federal District, and 0 if 
from elsewhere. HDI Personal Vote is an individual-level calculation of HDI, 
based on a given politician’s distribution of vote shares (see text). When corre-
lated with HDI State, this variable yields a coefficient of 0.912, which is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Ideology is centered at zero, with positive values signify-
ing right and negative signifying left (Zucco 2014). 
Firstly, although based on a very different analysis, this individual-level 
finding could be seen as broadly consistent with the aggregate cross-
national results of Inglehart and Norris (2003), who showed that the 
relationship between (female) gender and postmaterialism becomes posi-
tive at the highest levels of physical and economic security. Put another 
way, the relationship should be positive in “Belgium” but not in “India” 
– and given that the model is restricted to elite women, this could be 
interpreted as “Belgian women.” Secondly, the 12-item postmaterialism 
battery includes several value priorities that tap into the debate over 
public security in Brazil, such as “strong defense forces,” “maintaining 
order in the nation,” and “the fight against crime.” Impressionistically at 
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least, this debate appears heavily gendered insofar as male candidates and 
politicians typically seek “ownership” of law and order issues. If male 
legislators are more likely than female legislators to be policy seekers on 
public security, then biases in the PM12 battery would likely portray 
incumbent male politicians as significantly more materialist than their 
female colleagues. At the elite level, we could be observing differences 
between “Belgian women” and “security entrepreneurs.” 
Does Postmaterialism Predict Positions on 
“New Politics” Issues?
We now reverse our analytical lens and emplace postmaterialism as an 
independent variable rather than a dependent variable. Theoretically 
speaking, if the value change thesis is to have any validity, postmaterial-
ism should be able to accurately predict elite positioning on “new poli-
tics” issues associated with postmodernization. These debates are not 
exclusive to postindustrial societies, as can easily be seen by examining 
new policies on environmental protection in Mexico, on recognition of 
same-sex marriage in Argentina, or on decriminalization of drug use in 
Uruguay. Empirically speaking, a proper test is only possible if the policy 
issues to be studied are unrelated to the value priorities used in the con-
struction of the postmaterialist scale. Here we ask whether postmaterial-
ism predicts the orientations of Brazilian political elites in three policy 
areas: reproductive rights, same-sex marriage, and green politics. 
In BLS 2013, the survey statement pertaining to reproductive rights 
was framed as “abortion should be prohibited under all circumstances.” 
The statement related to sexual orientation was that “homosexual cou-
ples should have the right to marry.” BLS respondents used a five-point 
scale ranging from strong disagreement (score of 1) to strong agreement 
(score of 5). We reversed the scoring for the abortion variable, so that 
both the reproductive and gay rights responses should correlate positive-
ly with the 12-item postmaterialism index.  
On environmentalism, BLS 2013 reproduced a long-running survey 
item from the WVS in which respondents were asked: “Here are two 
statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment 
and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point 
of view?” The two alternatives were (1) “protecting the environment 
should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and 
some loss of jobs,” or (2) “economic growth and creating jobs should be 
the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” This is 
a clear (and difficult) binary choice.  
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Beyond the control variables included in Models 2–4 from Table 3, 
we also included variables capturing legislators’ membership in relevant 
issue caucuses in Congress. For the models predicting orientations on 
abortion rights and same-sex marriage, we included a dummy variable 
identifying membership in the cross-party Evangelical Caucus, which is a 
non-Catholic (mainly Pentecostal) religious faction that is reputationally 
associated with traditionalist positions on “new politics” issues. For the 
model predicting orientations on environmental issues, we included a 
dummy variable for membership in the cross-party Rural Caucus (bancada 
ruralista), which generally defends the interests of agricultural producers 
and large landowners.16 Given the differing forms of our dependent 
variables, we employ OLS when testing for value priorities on abortion 
rights and same-sex marriage and estimate a logit model when assessing 
parliamentarians’ orientations toward environmental protection.  
For the models in Table 4, all of the dependent variables have been 
coded so that higher values represent greater support for reproductive 
freedoms, same-sex marriage, and environmental protection. After we 
controlled for legislators’ income, age, education, gender, membership in 
directly relevant floor caucuses, and for the human development levels 
of their electoral constituencies, we found that postmaterialism has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on attitudinal support for all 
three issues: reproductive rights (Model 5), same-sex marriage (Model 6), 
and (albeit more weakly) environmental protection (Model 7). The most 
likely explanation for the weaker predictive power of postmaterialism on 
our third dependent variable is the format of the question used. Unlike 
the other two survey questions employed, that question established a 
difficult binary choice: environment versus growth. Many legislators are 
likely to feel that promoting economic growth and creating jobs are part 
of the job description of any member of the Brazilian legislature – in 
fact, many candidates use electoral messages that resemble the survey 
item at hand. Given Brazil’s uneven economic performance over the past 
30 years, we should expect that incumbent legislators see economic 
stewardship as a grave responsibility of public life, and that the trade-off 
between “jobs or the environment” is more salient to them than it is to 
members of the mass public. 
16  The heavily Pentecostal religious caucus calls itself the Frente Parlamentar Evan-
gélica and publishes its membership roster at <www.fpebrasil.com.br/portal>. 
The Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária (agriculture, livestock, and landowners’ 
faction) lists its members at <http://fpagropecuaria.org.br>. 
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Table 4. The Effect of Postmaterialist Value Priorities on Perceptions of 
Three ‘New Politics’ Issues 
 DV: Abortion 
Rights, OLS 
DV: Same-Sex 
Marriage OLS 
DV: Environment 
vs Economy, Logit 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Postmaterial-
ism (12-Item) 0.294*** 0.287** 0.393* 
 (0.112) (0.137) (0.212) 
HDI Personal 
Vote 0.437 3.530 -3.071 
 (2.240) (2.377) (3.981) 
Ideology 
(Zucco re-
scaled) 
-0.236* -0.464*** -0.363 
 (0.139) (0.154) (0.253) 
Personal 
Wealth (log) -0.085 -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.096) (0.085) (0.125) 
Age 0.014 0.001 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) 
Education 0.047 0.128 -0.075 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.154) 
Female -0.048 -0.295 0.66 
 (0.394) (0.416) (0.661) 
Evangelical 
Caucus -0.328 -0.396  
 (0.560) (0.535) 
Rural Caucus   -0.977** 
   -0.461 
Constant 2.134 -0.744 1.071 
 (2.196) (2.030) (3.193) 
N 128 126 123 
R-squared 0.171 0.226 0.131 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Goodness of fit in the logit models is 
Nagelkerke R2. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In other 
analyses (not shown), we found that suppression of the measure of ideology 
makes the PM12 index significant, and vice-versa. 
This means that the question framing might be responsible for underes-
timation, and that postmaterialism would have been a stronger predictor 
of environmental protection if the dependent variable had been meas-
ured with data from a question that did not invoke economic perfor-
mance. 
Similarly, our personalized measure of constituency-level socioeco-
nomic modernization produces a positive, albeit not statistically signifi-
cant, coefficient for our models predicting legislators’ attitudes towards 
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abortion and same-sex marriage, but yields a negative coefficient when 
the dependent variable assesses views on environmental protection.  
The rescaled measure of ideology produces a negative coefficient 
that is statistically significant in Models 5 (albeit weakly) and 6, which 
predict support for abortion rights and same-sex marriage, respectively. 
The magnitude and levels of statistical significance of coefficients sug-
gest that left-leaning legislators are more distinguishable in their support 
for LGBT rights than in their positioning on abortion. Brazilian mass 
opinion is clearly moving at different speeds when it comes to these two 
issues. Abortion in Brazil remains illegal except for cases of rape, fetal 
anencephaly, or danger to the life of the mother, but same-sex civil un-
ions were legalized in 2004 and full marriage equality was achieved in 
2013. 
Given the extreme homogeneity of the sample with regard to per-
sonal wealth, age, education, and gender, these variables yield no statisti-
cally significant coefficients. Nonetheless, the dummy for membership in 
the Rural Caucus expectedly produces a negative and significant coeffi-
cient in our Model 7. This binary variable goes a long way toward identi-
fying those Brazilian legislators who personally exploit natural resources. 
All in all, we conclude that the exploratory analyses summarized in 
Table 4 lend strong support to two of the three variants of H3. Post-
materialism correctly predicts elite attitudes toward two major “new 
politics” issues. This is significant, given that the construction of the 
postmaterialism index is wholly unrelated to the three debates tested.17 
Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether postmaterialism remains relevant 
when parliamentarians are concerned with pressing issues, such as eco-
nomic growth, industry, and potential job losses. The following section 
seeks to advance the debate by analyzing the voting behavior of Brazilian 
legislators when they are directly challenged to decide between economic 
and environmental gains/losses.  
17  One of the 12 values in the postmaterialism battery – “making our cities and 
countryside more beautiful” – was originally included to tap into aesthetic con-
siderations that might be linked to environmentalism in a general sense. How-
ever, this item did not load as expected onto the materialist/postmaterialism 
dimension. It remains in the 12-item battery, but has been abandoned in the 
construction of the 0–5 postmaterialism index used by Inglehart and collabora-
tors and replicated here (see Appendix A). 
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Does Postmaterialism Predict Voting Behavior 
on “New Politics” Issues?
The question of whether postmaterialism predicts not only the policy 
preferences of legislators but also their policy behavior – that is, their 
position on roll-call votes on some of the “new politics” issues examined 
here – is interesting, but difficult to investigate. As Zucco (2009) and 
Zucco and Lauderdale (2011) have shown, roll-call votes in the Brazilian 
Congress are dominated by a coalitional logic in which the pro-
presidential cartel defends the interests of the incumbent president on 
most key issues. Therefore, the majority of votes may be better explained 
by a government-versus-opposition logic than by ideology, or (we must 
assume) by postmaterialist value priorities as well.  
It might be possible to gain some insight if a Brazilian president 
took a clear stand on a controversial “new politics” issue, such as legali-
zation of abortion, or amendment of the Constitution to prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. Such a controversial stand 
would likely fracture the current governing alliance, which in part rests 
on an entente cordiale between the left-leaning executive and the tradition-
alist/moralist factions associated with Pentecostal churches (see Boas 
and Smith 2014), and could reveal the materialism/postmaterialism 
cleavage as a significant dimension of legislative voting. Although Brazil-
ian presidents have very few incentives to stake out positions that would 
divide their interparty coalitions, this is precisely what happened during 
the 2012 voting of the new Brazilian Forest Code.  
The Forest Code delimits conservation areas and provides guide-
lines for the proportion of land that should be preserved or reclaimed; 
these are, issues that directly impact the amount of available resources 
that rural producers can exploit. Given its controversial status among 
environmentalists and agricultural producers, the process of reforming 
the Code was long and laborious (1999–2012). Numerous versions were 
drafted and re-drafted by ministries and agencies of the federal govern-
ment (Pereira 2014: 2–5).  
The process came to a head in an historic session of the Chamber 
of Deputies on 25 April 2012. Parliamentarians were asked to vote for or 
against a new version of the Forest Code that included controversial 
amendments added by Deputy Paulo Piau. This was the most conten-
tious vote of the process, given one of these amendments sought to take 
the power of defining conservation areas away from the federal govern-
ment and give it to the states. This was a clear effort to empower large 
landowners and ranchers – many of whom double as provincial oligarchs 
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and have strong influence over local law enforcement – against envi-
ronmental regulators in Brasília. Both President Dilma Rousseff and her 
governing party, the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), came out 
strongly against this amendment. The president gave explicit instructions 
to her supporters to make the bill less permissive to deforestation. Yet 
her heterogeneous governing coalition also included elements of the 
“Rural Caucus,” which hoped to dilute the new Forest Code with Paulo 
Piau’s last-minute revisions. The discourse of the Rural Caucus was 
openly hostile toward environmentalists throughout the entire process of 
public debate (Pereira 2014). 
The watered-down version of the Forest Code ended up splitting 
the government coalition, which defied President Rousseff by passing 
the bill with 274 votes in favor and 184 votes against. This was portrayed 
as the most important legislative rebellion in Brazil in nearly a decade. 
Despite losing the battle, the president won the war. Armed with her 
amendatory veto, Dilma Rousseff struck out 12 of the 84 articles of the 
bill and promulgated the remainder of the legislation a month later. De-
spite a reversionary outcome favorable to the president, the controversial 
roll-call vote on 25 April seems very appropriate for testing our H4. The 
bill concerns a “new politics” issue (environmental protection) that di-
vided many parliamentarians and which, despite President Dilma’s 
strongly stated position, led various legislators to ignore their party 
whips. In other words, the breakdown of the predictable govern-
ment/opposition cleavage in the Chamber of Deputies was like a bolt of 
lightning that temporarily illuminated the “real” positions of legislators. 
Therefore, we use recorded voting on the Forest Code from 25 April, 
2012 to assess the explanatory power of the postmaterialist scale in pre-
dicting voting behavior on a “new politics” issue. 
Because we are not confident in our ability to interpret abstention 
or absence in this case, we have only considered those cases in which 
respondents took a clear yes or no position on the Forest Code. For this 
reason, and also because we are restricted here to federal deputies (not 
senators), the number of cases analyzed is reduced (N = 93). In Models 
8–11, reported in Table 5, the dependent variable is scored as 1 if the 
federal deputy took the pro-environmentalist position (that is, voted 
“no” on the controversial version of the bill) and is scored as zero if the 
deputy opted for the diluted version of the Forest Code. 
In Brazil, as in many other democracies, the party whip is a strong 
predictor of voting behavior on the floor of the legislature (Figueiredo 
and Limongi 1999, 2000). For this reason, we controlled for the effect of 
party positioning on this controversial vote. We created a whip variable 
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in which the value of -1 denoted a case in which the legislator received 
an explicit party recommendation to vote in favor of the bill (that is, 
tolerance of greater deforestation), a value of 0 means that the party 
floor leader remained silent (the party opted for a “free” or conscience 
vote), and a value of 1 refers to an order to vote against the bill (and for 
stronger environmental protection). Our scoring parallels the coding of 
the dependent variable detailed above. The declared positions of the 
party whips are documented in Appendix C.  
Table 5 summarizes our results. The findings are strongly congruent 
with neoinstitutionalist analyses of the Brazilian Congress and are largely 
incompatible with an attitudinal model; they disconfirm our H5. The 
variables capturing the party whip and factional organization (here, the 
Rural Caucus) are the most significant predictors of voting behavior. 
When we included these factors in the model along with our conven-
tional controls, postmaterialism had no effect on voting behavior on the 
floor of the Chamber of Deputies. (In other analyses not shown here, we 
found that postmaterialism had an effect only when left–right ideology 
and the party whip were excluded from our models.) 
Importantly, the HDI of a deputy’s personal vote base became sta-
tistically significant precisely when the control for party whip was ex-
cluded (Model 10). As we showed earlier, legislators elected by constitu-
encies with higher levels of economic security are more likely to be 
postmaterialists. At the same time, we observe that anti-environmentalist 
legislators are more likely to be drawn from low-HDI constituencies, 
where their respective primary sectors of the economy (such as agricul-
ture, ranching, mining, and lumbering) carry decisive weight in political 
life.18 Thus, the performance of HDI in Table 5 is consistent with the 
story of uneven socioeconomic modernization in Brazil. 
Two other variables also generate statistically significant coeffi-
cients. The rescaled measure of left–right ideology produces statistically 
significant and negative coefficients for Models 10 and 11, which exclude 
the binary controls for Party Whip and Rural Caucus, respectively. This 
suggests that left-wing politicians are more likely to support environmen-
tal protection, but that their voting behavior will ultimately be influenced 
by partisan and factional alignments in Congress. Interestingly, our con-
trol for age also produced negative coefficients that are statistically sig-
nificant for Models 8 and 9. This suggests that, other things being equal, 
older legislators are less likely to support environmental protection. Alt-
18  HDI Personal Vote and the binary control for membership in the Rural Caucus 
produce a correlation coefficient of -0.163 that is significant at p < .05.  
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hough more research is necessary here, it is very likely that the coeffi-
cient on age represents a cohort effect rather than a life cycle effect: 
older legislators are more likely to have personally experienced Brazil’s 
spectacular economic expansion in the period from 1930–1980, during 
which environmental protection was accorded minimal priority. Nostal-
gia for growth should be higher within earlier birth cohorts. 
Table 5. Predicting Roll-Call Voting on the Forest Code (DV=Support for 
Environmental Protection)
 DV: Forest Code Voting, Logit 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Postmaterialism (12-Item) 0.316 0.540 0.461 0.174 
 (0.403) (0.396) (0.294) (0.384) 
HDI Personal Vote 11.654 10.509 13.269** 12.836 
 (7.652) (6.347) (5.599) (7.789) 
Ideology (Zucco rescaled) -0.937  -1.388** -1.190** 
 (0.628)  (0.626) (0.597) 
Personal Wealth (log) 0.121 0.034 -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.190) (0.161) (0.139) (0.143) 
Age -0.053** -0.045** -0.055 -0.049* 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.035) (0.025) 
Education 0.026 0.088 0.158 -0.003 
 (0.266) (0.222) (0.219) (0.250) 
Female 0.600 0.759 -0.145 0.464 
 (0.832) (0.875) (0.803) (0.790) 
Rural Caucus -1.980** -2.510** -0.946  
 (0.968) (0.999) (0.646)  
Party Whip 1.789*** 2.066***  1.479*** 
 (0.450) (0.486)  (0.400) 
Constant -7.965** -6.982* -9.463** -7.577 
 (3.840) (3.743) (3.713) (4.001) 
N 92 93 92 92 
R-squared 0.524 0.497 0.360 0.479 
Note:  The DV is coded as 1 for opposition to the bill (see text) and zero for support. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Goodness of fit for the logit models is 
Nagelkerke R2. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Ultimately, our findings reinforce the idea that “institutions trump val-
ues” (that is, that party whips and factional organization are more im-
portant than the value priorities of deputies). This is in line with most 
scholars of Brazilian legislative behavior, as well as with qualitative inves-
tigation of the Forest Code reform. Amanda Pereira’s work on the For-
est Code (2014: 20–21) showed, through descriptive statistics and pro-
cess tracing, that despite brief ideological disagreements, party discipline 
(as opposed to coalition discipline) remained high throughout the voting 
process. Her work, as well as ours, shows that party loyalties matter, 
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even when the standard government-versus-opposition cleavage was 
strongly undermined by the Forest Code debate. Even with a last-minute 
rebellion within the government coalition, there was still order in chaos; 
the party whip remained a very strong predictor of the most controver-
sial vote. This finding is entirely consistent with previous studies that 
have highlighted party discipline as the “norm” of legislative politics in 
Brazil (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000) and illustrated why attitudinal 
postmaterialism is unlikely to explain voting behavior even in “favora-
ble” circumstances. In sum, Brazilian postmaterialists can be elected to 
Congress, but once inside the institution they are constrained by its or-
ganizational features and by the broader logic of executive–legislative 
relations under coalitional presidentialism. 
Concluding Remarks  
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of postmaterialism among 
members of a national legislature in Latin America. In this paper, we 
have mapped the distribution of postmaterialist value priorities among 
the Brazilian political class as of 2013 and investigated how well these 
priorities predict elite orientations across several major issues of public 
policy. To the limited extent possible, we also compared the value syn-
dromes of political elites to those of the Brazilian mass public as meas-
ured in the World Values Survey of 2014. Our efforts to probe elite-mass 
congruence were hampered by the fact that the artificial pooling of the 
two datasets creates an unbalanced population from which valid statisti-
cal inferences cannot be derived. Nonetheless, our “thought experiment” 
suggests that Brazilian political elites are disproportionately postmaterial-
ist, even when we control for the fact that they are vastly wealthier and 
better educated than the mass public. 
Overall, the descriptive and multivariate analyses conducted in this 
paper show strong and consistent support for some key predictions 
drawn from the theory of value change originated by Ronald Inglehart 
and his collaborators. The salient findings of the paper are as follows. As 
per H1, Brazilian political elites show much higher commitment to 
postmaterialist values than members of the mass public. Brazilian politi-
cal elites drawn from constituencies with high human development are 
more postmaterialist than their counterparts from less developed regions 
(H2b, the Belindia hypothesis). Among members of Congress, the mate-
rialist/postmaterialist cleavage overlaps with the left–right cleavage, 
especially at the party level (H2ba). Furthermore, in accordance with 
Inglehart’s original expectations, postmaterialism successfully predicts 
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individual elite positioning on a number of “new politics” issues that are 
independent of the scale construction, such as abortion (H3a), same-sex 
marriage (H3b), and environmental protection (H3c). Finally, we found 
that postmaterialism is a better predictor of legislators’ attitudes than of 
their behavior (thus disconfirming H4). A case study of a key battle over 
environmental regulation suggested that party discipline and factional 
organization on the floor of Congress overcome the influence of value 
priorities among elites. However, survey research among legislators can 
continue to illuminate fault lines in the party system that are often invisi-
ble when it comes to legislative voting (Power and Zucco 2012). Post-
materialism is one of those fault lines.
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Pós-materialismo e Elites Políticas: As Prioridades de Valores 
entre os Parlamentares Federais Brasileiros 
Resumo: No atual artigo, examinamos a distribuição e as consequências 
das orientações pós-materialistas entre os parlamentares federais no 
Brasil. Usando dados coletados pela Pesquisa Legislativa Brasileira (Bra-
zilian Legislative Survey) em 2013, realizamos o primeiro estudo sistemá-
tico das preferências pós-materialistas dentro do Congresso Nacional e 
do sistema partidário, e mapeamos a escala materialista/pós-materialista 
considerando outras condições salientes dentro da classe política. Apre-
sentamos cinco conclusões principais. Em primeiro lugar, as elites políti-
cas evidenciam compromisso muito maior com valores pós-materialistas 
do que o público em massa. Em segundo lugar, as elites políticas brasilei-
ras oriundas de eleitorados com desenvolvimento humano elevado são 
mais pós-materialistas do que os seus homólogos de outros distritos 
eleitorais. Em terceiro lugar, entre a classe política, a clivagem materialis-
ta/pós-materialista mostra certa congruência com relação à clivagem 
esquerda-direita. Em quarto lugar, embora preferências pós-materialistas 
consigam prever o posicionamento de parlamentares em uma série de 
questões da “nova política” alheias à construção da própria escala mate-
rialista/pós-materialista, o pós-materialismo é um pobre preditor do 
comportamento dos parlamentares em relacão à votação no plenário. 
Por último, assim como outros autores anteriores, mostramos que fato-
res institucionais são melhores preditores das votações nominais no 
contexto brasileiro. 
Palavras-chave: Brasil, pós-materialismo, política legislativas, nova polí-
tica 
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Appendix A 
The 4-Item and 12-Item Postmaterialism Batteries Used in the World Val-
ues Surveys 
 
“People talk a lot about which goals Brazil should pursue over the next 
ten years. Which of the following goals do you personally think is the 
most important? And the second most important?” 
 
• A high level of economic growth 
• Making sure this country has strong defense forces 
• Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities 
• Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful 
 
“If you had to choose, which of the following things do you think is the 
most important right now? And the second most important?” 
 
• Maintaining order in the nation 
• Giving people more say in important government decisions 
• Fighting rising prices  
• Protecting freedom of speech 
 
“Here is another list of objectives. In your opinion, which of these is the 
most important? And the second most important?” 
 
• A stable economy 
• Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society 
• Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money 
• The fight against crime 
 
The original 4-item battery is based on the second bloc of questions, and 
classifies respondents into one of three groups corresponding to their 
value priorities. They are “postmaterialists” if they select the two post-
materialist goals in this bloc (in italics here), “materialists” if they select 
the two others, and “mixed” if they select one of each type. The 12-item 
battery yields a continuous variable based on all three blocs of questions. 
It measures how many of the five total postmaterialist goals were ac-
corded high priority by the respondent, that is, were selected as the first 
or second choice from within each bloc. Thus the range of the PM12 
variable is 0-5. 
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Appendix B 
List of Brazilian States and Their Respective Abbreviations 
Abbreviation State
AC Acre
AL Alagoas
AP Amapá
AM Amazonas
BA Bahia
CE Ceará
DF Distrito Federal
ES Espírito Santo
GO Goiás
MA Maranhão
MT Mato Grosso
MS Mato Grosso do Sul
MG Minas Gerais
PR Paraná
PB Paraíba
PA Pará
PE Pernambuco
PI Piauí
RJ Rio de Janeiro
RN Rio Grande do Norte
RS Rio Grande do Sul
RO  Rondonia
RR Roraima
SC Santa Catarina
SE Sergipe
SP  São Paulo
TO Tocantins
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Appendix C 
Party Whip Positions on the Forest Code Vote, 25 April 2012 
Whip in Favour of Bill as Amended (and for weaker environmental 
protection):  
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB)
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)
Partido Social Democrático (PSD)
Partido da República (PR) 
Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PT do B) 
Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRP)
Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (PHS)
Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC)
Partido Social Liberal (PSL) 
Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB) 
Democratas (DEM) 
Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Partido Social Cristão (PSC) 
 
Whip Against the Bill as Amended (and for stronger environmental 
protection):  
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
Partido Verde (PV) 
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) 
Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB)
Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) 
 
Free Vote: 
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) 
Partido Progressista (PP)  
Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) 
Source:  Associação O Eco, “Código Florestal: lista de quem votou pró ou contra o 
relatório Piau”, published 25 April 2012. Online: <www.oeco.org.br/noticias/25 
935-codigo-florestal-divulgado-lista-de-quem-votou-sim-ou-nao> (11 Decem-
ber 2015). 
